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WELFARE REFORM AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM:
LOW-INCOME MOTHERS' DECISIONS ABOUT
WORK AT HOME AND IN THE MARKET
Dorothy E. Roberts*
I. INTRODUCTION
In October 2003, the New York Times Magazine featured
an article about high-powered women who have opted out of
the workplace to become full-time moms. The cover showed a
woman and toddler sitting on the ground together in front of
a ladder reaching beyond the cover's frame. The caption read,
"Q: Why Don't More Women Get to the Top? A: They Choose
Not To. Abandoning the Climb and Heading Home."' Author
Lisa Belkin reported that a growing number of professional
women with advanced degrees are choosing to leave prestig-
ious jobs to care for their children at home. Despite volumi-
nous literature on the obstacles to career advancement that
mothers face,2 Belkin argued that "[i]t's not just that the
workplace has failed women. It is also that women are reject-
ing the workplace."3
If there is an "opt-out revolution" fomenting among pro-
fessional women, it is not one to which poor mothers have
been invited. The primary goal of the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA)
* Kirkland and Ellis Professor, Northwestern University School of Law;
Faculty Fellow, Institute for Policy Research. Meaghan Chmura and Matthew
Lyon provided excellent research assistance for this article.
1. Lisa Belkin, The Opt-Out Revolution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2003, § 6
(Magazine), at 42.
2. See, e.g., JOAN C. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER (2000); SYLVIA ANN
HEWLETT, CREATING A LIFE 64-113 (2002); ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF
MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST IMPORTANT JOB IN THE WORLD IS STILL THE
LEAST VALUED 13-44 (2001).
3. Belkin, supra note 1, at 44.
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is to move mothers from welfare to the paid workforce.4 Wel-
fare reform eliminated the federal guarantee of a basic in-
come support for all families and replaced it with Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF), a state-run program
combining work requirements and sanctions for nonconform-
ing behavior.5 The central message of welfare reform is that
recipient mothers are deviant for staying home and would
better serve their children by finding jobs.6 PRWORA does
not give mothers a choice; the law mandates that recipients
find paid employment or risk sanctions' and imposes a
twenty-four month limit, and five-year lifetime maximum, on
receipt of benefits.'
Nor have feminists always advocated for poor mothers'
freedom to choose between home and market. Welfare reform
has been framed in popular discourse and feminist scholar-
ship as a debate over whether it is better for government to
support women's caregiving or women's participation in the
labor market.9 Most attempts to resolve this tension address
difficulties working mothers face in balancing the demands of
full-time employment and caring for children. Although the
work-family conflict experienced by mothers of all socio-
economic levels is well-documented, less attention has been
paid to the freedom of mothers to decide whether or not to
work full time outside the home.
This article examines the impact of welfare reform on
low-income women's ability to make decisions about caregiv-
4. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) § 103(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2) (2004) (stating that one purpose of
the Act is to "end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by
promoting job preparation, work, and marriage"); see also Ladonna Pavetti &
Nancy Wemmerus, From a Welfare Check to a Paycheck: Creating a New Social
Contract, 20 J. LAB. RES. 517 (1999) (discussing ways in which PRWORA en-
sures that state TANF programs emphasize employment, including requiring
states to meet increasing work participation rates).
5. See PRWORA §§ 101-116, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617, 619.
6. See infra notes 135-60 and accompanying text.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 607(e); see also Pavetti & Wemmerus, supra note 4, at 520-
21 (discussing sanctions for noncompliance with welfare rules).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 602(a)(1)(A)(ii), 608(a)(7).
9. See, e.g., Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths:
Independence, Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POLY
& L. 13, 14-19 (2000) (discussing the societal assumption of welfare mothers as
dependants and arguing that caretaking work creates a collective debt); Vicki
Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1914-16, 1930-38 (2000) (advo-
cating for support of women's paid labor outside the home).
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ing and paid employment. I will call this ability women's
"economic freedom," recognizing that both caregiving and
paid employment have economic value and affect women's
economic welfare. Part II provides a historical context by ex-
ploring both welfare policy and feminist theorizing on moth-
ers' work at home and in the market. I discuss how the wel-
fare system has shifted since its inception from supporting
single mothers' care for their children to pushing mothers
into the workforce. I also discuss the parallel tension be-
tween feminist approaches to women's economic equality that
emphasize increasing mothers' workforce participation versus
those that advocate state support for caregiving. I suggest as
an alternative approach the welfare rights movement's rejec-
tion of the care/work dichotomy and its advocacy of poor
mothers' freedom to choose between the two.
Part III demonstrates how welfare reform denies eco-
nomic freedom to low-income women. Although the
PRWORA facilitated recipients' entry into the paid workforce,
it fails to provide the resources mothers need to care for their
children and to earn a livable income at the same time.'1
Moreover, welfare reform's incentives are lopsided: they de-
value and penalize poor mothers' care work. Finally, Part IV
considers the resources low-income mothers need to make de-
cisions about working at home or in the market. A guaran-
teed income, greater access to advanced education, and in-
creased subsidized child care are critical means for mothers
to have economic freedom.
II. THE HISTORICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Welfare reform's treatment of recipients' care for their
children and participation in the paid workforce developed
against the backdrop of a century of social policy and feminist
debates addressing women's relationship to the home and the
market. Both welfare programs and feminist theorizing have
tended to frame these aspects of women's economic welfare in
dichotomous terms, pitting mothers' role as unpaid caregivers
against their role as paid workers.
10. See Karen Syma Czapanskiy, Parents, Children, and Work-First Wel-
fare Reform: Where Is the C in TANF?, 61 MD. L. REV. 308, 335 (2002); infra
notes 135-46 and accompanying text.
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A. Welfare Policy
The goal of welfare policy has shifted radically from en-
couraging most poor mothers to stay home to pushing them
into paid employment. Maternalist legislation enacted during
the Progressive Era laid the groundwork for the modern fed-
eral welfare system and shaped the terms of the debate about
state support for mothering that still resonate in welfare pol-
icy discussions today.11 A network of elite women reformers
successfully exploited the ideology of motherhood to win pub-
lic support for unmarried and widowed mothers living in pov-
erty. The logic that propelled welfare legislation then was
precisely the opposite of today's welfare reform philosophy:
widowed and single mothers needed government aid so that
they would not have to relinquish their maternal duties in the
home to join the workforce.
A defining aspect of this welfare vision, however, was the
social control of poor immigrant families and the neglect of
Black women. 2 Worried about urban immigrants' threat to
the social order, the elite women reformers treated welfare as
a means of supervising and disciplining recipients as much as
a means of providing charity. 3 They feared that welfare that
was too generous might provide an incentive for state de-
pendency, moral degeneracy, and family breakdown. 4 The
first maternalist welfare programs, moreover, were intended
for white mothers only; administrators either failed to estab-
lish programs in locations with large Black populations or
distributed benefits according to standards, such as suitable
home tests, that disqualified Black mothers. 5
The New Deal's establishment of a federal welfare sys-
tem preserved discrimination against Black mothers. 6 In the
11. See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND
THE HISTORY OF WELFARE, 1890-1935 (1994).
12. Id. at 304; see also GWENDOLYN MINK, THE WAGES OF MOTHERHOOD:
INEQUALITY IN THE WELFARE STATE, 1917-42, 3-120 (1995).
13. GORDON, supra note 11, at 29.
14. Id. at 180.
15. Id. at 48; see also MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF
WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 201
(rev. ed. 1996). Suitable home tests based eligibility for benefits on casework-
ers' judgments about recipients' moral fitness, including the mother's marital
status. See MINK, supra note 12, at 143-45 (discussing state-level "illegiti-
macy" rules in the Aid to Dependent Children program as a source of racial
bias).
16. GORDON, supra note 11, at 275-76; JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF
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1960s, the welfare rights movement secured federal entitle-
ments to welfare benefits, dramatically changing the demo-
graphics of the welfare rolls. 7 But as welfare became increas-
ingly associated with Black mothers, it became increasingly
burdened with behavior modification rules, work require-
ments, and reduced effective benefits levels. 8 By the mid-
1990s, the American public equated welfare with Black fe-
male degeneracy and supported the elimination of the federal
entitlement along with the mandate that recipients find paid
employment. 9
The original conception of welfare did not promote moth-
ers' economic freedom. From the outset, these programs were
grossly inadequate to meet the needs of female-headed fami-
lies.20 Historian Linda Gordon traces the programs' stingi-
ness to women reformers' adherence to a patriarchal family
norm that relied on husbands to be the breadwinner." The
crusaders who created welfare for single mothers were guided
by a faith in the "family wage" and in mothers' economic de-
pendence on men." They believed in the prevailing sexual di-
vision of labor that "prescribes earnings as the sole responsi-
bility of husbands and unpaid domestic labor as the only
proper long-term occupation for women."2 They therefore ad-
vocated a living wage for each family that enabled the hus-
band to support a dependent, service-providing wife, rather
than programs that would facilitate female independence.24
The New Deal reinforced this gender norm by instituting
a stratified and unequal structure for public assistance that
provided support for caregiving women and for working men
through separate programs.25 Social insurance (Social Secu-
rity and unemployment insurance) provided a dignified enti-
tlement to primarily white, male wage earners and their
wives; Aid to Dependent Children (ADC) doled out humiliat-
WELFARE: HOW RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY 20-24 (1994).
17. MINK, supra note 12, at 182-83.
18. Id.
19. See, e.g., Risa E. Kaufman, The Cultural Meaning of the "Welfare
Queen " Using State Constitutions to Challenge Child Exclusion Provisions, 23
N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 301 (1997).
20. See GORDON, supra note 11, at 61-62.
21. Seeid.
22. Id. at 51-54.
23. Id. at 53.
24. Id. at 51-54.
25. Id. at 253-85.
2004 1033
SANTA CLARA LA W REVIEW
ing relief to poor single mothers. ADC's inferiority was en-
hanced by its provision of aid exclusively to the child, defeat-
ing the position that mothers' aid compensated women's work
in the home and service to society as a principle of entitle-
ment.26 While rejecting this potentially radical construction
of women's caregiving as work, the New Deal welfare system
incorporated the most restrictive aspects of the earlier re-
formers' view-the reliance on male wages to meet the needs
of families and the moral supervision of recipients of poor re-
lief.
Whereas the federal government has imposed mandatory
work programs on single welfare recipients for decades,27 it
has expected affluent, married mothers to stay home to care
for their children. In her textual analysis of child care policy
debates in the late 1980s, Katherine Teghtsoonian found that
conservative opponents of the Act for Better Child Care Ser-
vices (the ABC bill), which extended public support for out-of-
home child care, "articulated a strongly held belief that full-
time care by mothers is the best arrangement for children
and that government policy ought to be facilitating it."28
These congressmen, however, excluded mothers receiving
AFDC benefits from their support of full-time caregiving, pre-
scribing instead "mandatory labor force participation, with
their children placed in out-of-home care contexts while they
work."29 Because child care is viewed as a service for needy
mothers rather than a universal social program, it has failed
to attract adequate state support. °
Welfare policy at the turn of the twenty-first century has
come full circle. Contemporary welfare reform rhetoric and
law resurrects the early twentieth-century anxiety about sin-
gle motherhood as well as the promotion of mothers' economic
dependence on husbands. A primary mission of welfare re-
form is to promote marriage as a means of reducing poverty
and providing stable homes for poor children. The PRWORA
26. See GORDON, supra note 11, at 282.
27. See generally NANCY E. ROSE, WORKFARE OR FAIR WORK: WOMEN,
WELFARE, AND GOVERNMENT WORK PROGRAMS (1995).
28. Katherine Teghtsoonian, The Work of Caring for Children: Contradic-
tory Themes in American Child Care Policy Debates, 17 WOMEN & POLITICS 77,
84 (1997).
29. Id. at 89.
30. Id. at 92; see also SONYA MICHEL, CHILDREN'S INTERESTS/MOTHERS'
RIGHTS: THE SHAPING OF AMERICA'S CHILD CARE POLICY (1999).
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declares that "marriage is the foundation of a successful soci-
ety" and "an essential social institution which promotes the
interests of children and society at large."3 It also contains a
list of "the negative consequences of an out-of-wedlock birth
on a child, the mother, and society," as well as measures de-
signed to penalize unwed mothers and their children.
The thesis that marriage will reduce poverty puts the
cart before the horse. Research shows that economic security
produces stable marriages, not that marriage itself secures
women's economic welfare. There is a positive association be-
tween earning power and marriage: increasing people's in-
come increases their chances of marrying.33 State and federal
marriage promotion programs are unlikely to have much ef-
fect without providing better-paying jobs for recipients and
their potential marriage partners.
B. Feminist Theorizing on Caregiving and Paid Work
The question whether welfare should aid mothers' care-
giving or encourage mothers to transition to paid employment
arises in a larger debate within feminist thinking about
women's economic welfare. Is the path to gender equality to
be found in supporting women's work at home or work in the
market? The most popular feminist approach has empha-
sized the importance of women's labor market equality, while
a growing feminist discourse advocates greater state support
for women's caregiving at home.34 In the context of welfare
reform, this conflict centers on which kind of support is most
beneficial for mothers who cannot rely on a husband's income.
31. 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2004).
32. Id.
33. See Theodora Ooms, Center for Law and Social Policy, Marriage-Plus,
13 AM. PROSPECT (Apr. 8, 2002), available at
http://prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleld=621
0 (last visited Apr. 24, 2004).
34. This debate parallels "the clash between two social ideals: the ideal-
worker norm on the job, and the norm of parental care at home." Joan Wil-
liams, Our Economy of Mothers and Others: Women and Economics Revisited, 5
J. GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE 411, 417 (2002). For a fascinating discussion of
the impact of ideologies regarding the value given to women's paid and unpaid
work on welfare policy in England and France, see Joya Misra, Mothers or
Workers? The Value of Women 's Labor: Women and the Emergence of Family
Allowance Policy, 12 GENDER & Soc. 376 (1998). Misra argues that the interac-
tion between women's movements and these gender ideologies determines the
"woman-friendliness" of the resulting policy. Id. at 380.
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The dominant feminist approach has advocated women's
economic liberation by escaping confinement to the domestic
sphere and participating in the paid labor market on equal
terms with men.35 The early women's movement abandoned
claims to joint rights in marital property based on the value
of wives' work in the home to campaign for earnings statutes
that recognized wives' rights to wages.36 "In the years after
the Civil War," writes legal historian Reva Siegel, "feminists
began to disparage the household labor they originally sought
to emancipate and to argue that women could achieve eco-
nomic equality with men only by working outside the home
for a market wage like men.
3
Feminist legal scholar Joan Williams traces this focus on
labor market participation from Charlotte Perkins Gilman's
Women and Economics to Betty Friedan's The Feminine Mis-
tique.3" Professor Williams observes, "[feminism today is still
associated with an insistence on employment for women with
day care centers as the solution for the conflict between work
and family demands." 9  The key to economic equality, in
other words, is for women to achieve the same workforce par-
ticipation as men while delegating household chores and child
care to professional workers.
Williams argues that this "full-commodification" model is
flawed by accepting three basic elements of the house-
wife/breadwinner dichotomy: the model accepts "the ideal of a
worker who starts to work in early adulthood and works for
forty years straight, taking no time off for child-bearing or
child rearing;" "the notion that household labor is not 'work;'
and "the privatized theory that reproductive work is a private
responsibility and not a public necessity."4 ° All of these as-
sumptions negate experiences of women who continue to per-
form the bulk of child care.
Advocacy of waged work as the principal means for
women's emancipation disregards the experiences of most
women of color in particular. First, the notion that employ-
35. Williams, supra note 34, at 412-13.
36. Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work The First Women's Rights Claims Con-
cerning Wives'Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1147 (1994).
37. Id. at 1079.
38. Williams, supra note 34, at 412-13.
39. Id. at 413.
40. Id.
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ment is inherently liberating contradicts slave women's ex-
perience of forced labor and the discriminatory working con-
ditions that minority women have historically faced. The
market-centered approach tends to focus on a romanticized
middle-class quest for entrance into elite professions, rather
than on the women who are exploited as a source of cheap la-
bor.4' Black women historically experienced work outside the
home primarily as an aspect of racial subordination and the
home primarily as a site of solace and resistance to white op-
42pression.
Moreover, the flawed components of the feminist model
Williams identified were supported by exploiting race and
class hierarchies among women. Privileged women have re-
solved the tension between raising children and paid em-
ployment without changing the sexual status quo by relying
on the low-paid domestic work of less privileged women, espe-
cially women of color.43 The racial division of domestic service
grounded in the institution of slavery persisted in the face of
women's expanded participation in the paid workforce and
the increased commodification of household chores in the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century." Thus, women's increased
participation in the market alone will not eliminate the racial
division of women's work.
In contrast to the market-centered approach, a growing
feminist jurisprudence centers on theorizing care work and
advocates greater recognition and support for women's care-
giving.4 An earlier feminist account of care characterized it
41. BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN: BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 146
(1981).
42. PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE,
CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 46-47 (1990); ELIZABETH
V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXCLUSION IN FEMINIST
THOUGHT 123, 132 (1988). See generally JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE,
LABOR OF SORROW: BLACK WOMEN, WORK AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO
THE PRESENT (1985).
43. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 145-76; Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiri-
tual and Menial Housework, YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51, 59-62 (1997); Mary Ro-
mero, Unraveling Privilege: Workers' Children and the Hidden Costs of Paid
Childcare, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1651, 1654 (2001).
44. See Evelyn Nakano Glen, Cleaning Up/Kept Down: A Historical Per-
spective on Racial Inequality in 'Women's Work" 43 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1347
(1991).
45. See, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 2; MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER TWENTIETH-CENTURY
TRAGEDIES (1995); NANCY FOLBRE, THE INVISIBLE HEART: ECONOMICS AND
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as a manifestation of women's sex-specific nature.46 The more
recent approach does not see care as an essential "emanation"
from women, but as a socially constructed and political prac-
tice that provides tremendous social value and whose lack of
47
social support seriously disadvantages women.
The pathbreaking work of feminist legal theorist Martha
Albertson Fineman powerfully contests the premise that
women's caregiving is a private duty rather than a public
good.48 Fineman critiques the nuclear-family norm for leaving
women with the burden of caregiving while denying them
adequate government support. Assigning the care of children
to the traditional private family, Fineman argues, merely ob-
scures the inevitability and costs of children's dependency. 9
While Fineman stresses society's responsibility to aid in-
dividuals in their care of dependents, Williams highlights the
need to eliminate the ideal worker norm in market work and
family entitlements that discriminate against mothers. Al-
though most mothers now engage in wage labor, they con-
tinue to do the bulk of household work. Williams shows that
this gender system forces mothers to marginalize themselves
economically by failing to perform as ideal workers so that
they can facilitate their husbands' performance of that role
and care for their children.50
A clash has recently emerged between feminist legal
scholars who emphasize the importance of women's equal
participation in the paid workforce and those who emphasize
FAMILY VALUES (2001); MONA HARRINGTON, CARE AND EQUALITY: INVENTING A
NEW FAMILY POLITICS 106 (1999); EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE'S LABOR: ESSAYS
ON WOMEN, EQUALITY, AND DEPENDENCY 118-19 (1999); JOAN C. TRONTO,
MORAL BOUNDARIES: A POLITICAL ARGUMENT FOR AN ETHIC OF CARE (1994).
See generally Katharine B. Silbaugh, Symposium on the Structures of Care
Work, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1389, 1389 (2001).
46. Kathryn Abrams, The Second Coming of Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV.
1605, 1607 (2001). See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE:
PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982).
47. Abrams, supra note 46, at 1612.
48. See generally FINEMAN, supra note 45, at 163; Fineman, supra note 9, at
13.
49. FINEMAN, supra note 45, at 163. Joan Williams notes that fathers can
perform as ideal workers only by depending on child care and other family work
performed by their female partners. Williams, supra note 34, at 418. Recogniz-
ing mothers' contribution to male wages "flips the traditional understanding of
who is dependent on whom." Id. at 419.
50. Williams, supra note 34, at 430
1038 Vol: 44
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the importance of state support for women's caregiving.5'
Critics of the caregiving scholarship worry that directing pub-
lic support to mothers' caregiving reifies the gendered divi-
sion of labor and women's traditional role in the home,52 rein-
forces a maternalist norm that stifles a positive concept of
female sexuality, 3 subjects family arrangements to state
regulation,54 and unfairly shifts the costs of child raising to
workers without children.5 As a practical matter, some crit-
ics argue that facilitating women's caregiving is less effective
at achieving gender equality than challenging barriers in the
workplace "so that women can make greater economic inroads
on a level that will provide them with greater real choices
51. See id. (noting that "t]here seems to be a controversy brewing within
feminist jurisprudence over which of these approaches [to domesticity and mar-
ket work] is best"). Joan Williams characterizes this controversy as a recycling
of the sameness/difference debate: "Feminists committed to making tradition-
ally masculine gender performances available to women [the 'tomboy strategy']
are pitted against feminists committed to decreasing the costs of conventionally
feminine gender performances [the 'femme strategy']." Joan Williams, 'It's
Snowing Down South:" How to Help Mothers and Avoid Recycling the Same-
ness/Difference Debate, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 812, 815 (2002) [hereinafter Wil-
liams, It's Snowing Down South]. One illustration of this debate is the ex-
change in Columbia Law Review between Vickie Shultz, who advocates basing
women's identity primarily on paid work, and Joan Williams, who advocates
changing workplace conditions and norms to reflect women's identity as moth-
ers. See Vicki Schultz, supra note 9; Williams, It's Snowing Down South, supra;
see also Michael Selmi, Care, Work, and the Road to Equality: A Commentary
on Fineman and Williams, 76 CHI-KENT L. REV. 1557-58 (2001) (disagreeing
with the claim by Martha Fineman and Joan Williams that "facilitating
women's work in the home with children and other dependents [is] a way of fur-
thering women's interests").
52. See, e.g., Schultz, supra note 9, at 1905-06; Michael Selmi & Naomi
Cahn, Caretaking and the Contradictions of Contemporary Policy, 55 ME. L.
REV. 289, 290 (2003). Schultz argues that proposals facilitating women's care-
giving "would likely have a serious negative effect on the quest for greater
equality for women, particularly in the workplace, and they are likely to pro-
duce a replay of the debate over 'difference' feminism from the 1980s by identi-
fying women as caretakers and by appearing to accept gendered differences."
53. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes. An Essay on Feminism,
Law, andDesire, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 183-98 (2001).
54. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, Taking Care, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1541
(2001); Martha M. Ertman, Changing the Meaning of Motherhood, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1733 (2001).
55. Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple t'e?A Few Troubling Questions
About Where, Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be
Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1753 (2001). For a comprehensive response to
the theories of Katherine Franke and Mary Ann Case, see Mary Becker, Care
and Feminists, 17 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (2002).
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than currently exist." 56
One response to this controversy is to recognize that
feminists can do both. 7 There is room for feminists of both
persuasions to work simultaneously on compensating moth-
ers' caregiving while removing barriers to women's equal par-
ticipation in the market. Poor single mothers, especially
nonwhite women, are disadvantaged by both the stigma at-
tached to their caregiving and by barriers to finding employ-
ment that can support their families. They benefit from ef-
forts that address both forms of disadvantage.
Reconciling the two positions is more difficult, however,
when scholars see public support for caregiving as necessarily
opposed to women's increased labor market participation.
Michael Selmi and Naomi Cahn, for example, contend that
"emphasizing the importance of care work to women, and its
status as a public good, suggests that women do, and should,
privilege care work over their paid market work.""8 Proposals
to place greater social value on caregiving, they conclude,
"would likely have a serious negative effect on the quest for
greater equality for women, particularly in the workplace."59
Pitting public support for caregiving against women's in-
creased equality discounts the extra devaluation of poor and
minority women's work in the home and the importance of
public recognition of its economic value to challenge their dis-
advantaged status.
Another way of rejecting the dichotomous thinking that
characterizes work/caregiving debates is to enable low-income
mothers to make their own decisions about whether and
56. Selmi, supra note 51, at 1558; see also Selmi & Cahn, supra note 52, at
297-306.
57. See Williams, supra note 34, at 430-31; Selmi & Cahn, supra note 52, at
291 ("[W]e argue that in addition to stressing the importance of caretaking, the
left should focus on other issues that affect women's equality, such as education,
the timing and length of the school calendar, and continued workplace discrimi-
nation."); see also Williams, It's Snowing Down South, supra note 51, at 816-17
("Feminism is a loose coalition of many women who are dissatisfied with tradi-
tional gender constraints for a variety of reasons."). Cf Deborah L. Rhode, Bal-
anced Lives, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 834 (2002) (arguing for "a reconstruction of
public policies, workplace structures, and cultural values to promote balanced
lives for both men and women"). Deborah Rhode argues that the goal of femi-
nists should be "a fuller integration of employment, family, and civic commit-
ments than is now possible in most workplaces .... " Id. at 834-35.
58. Selmi & Cahn, supra note 52, at 306.
59. Id. at 290.
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when to work inside and outside the home. In other words,
feminists should be concerned with increasing low-income
women's economic freedom. The goal of economic freedom
corresponds with the aims of the welfare rights movement,
comprised mainly of poor Black mothers receiving AFDC,
that fought to expand access to welfare in the 1960s and
1970s.60 These mothers advocated a right to public assistance
both as compensation for their labor in the home and as a
means to allow them to make the same choices about caregiv-
ing and paid employment that middle-class women made.6
In short, "[r]ather than prescribing that women either enter
the workforce or stay home with children, choose to marry or
reject marriage, welfare activists demanded that women have
the power to define their own lives."62
Far from reinforcing women's traditional role in the
home, advocating women's economic freedom promotes
women's autonomy to make decisions about what is best for
themselves and their children. Thus, I do not think that the
charge made by Selmi and Cahn, that proposals to support
care work "appear to be targeted more at benefiting depend-
ents rather than women," applies to the economic freedom
approach."
III. THE IMPACT OF WELFARE REFORM ON ECONOMIC
FREEDOM
In a sense, welfare reform increased the resources needed
for poor mothers to enter the workforce. Some scholars criti-
cized Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) for
making it financially foolhardy for poor mothers to leave the
welfare rolls because they lost needed services for their chil-
dren which they could not afford on low-wage jobs. Welfare
60. See Premilla Nadasen, Expanding the Boundaries of the Women's Move-
ment: Black Feminism and the Struggle for Welfare Rights, 28 FEMINIST
STUDIES 271 (2002); Felicia Kornbluh, The Goals of the National Welfare Rights
Movement: Why We Need Them Thirty Years Later, 24 FEMINIST STUDIES 65
(1998).
61. See Nadasen, supra note 60,. at 279.
62. Id. at 273.
63. Selmi & Cahn, supra note 52, at 306; see also Gwendolyn Mink, The
Lady and the Tramp (II): Feminist Welfare Politics, Poor Single Mothers, and
the Challenge of Welfare Justice, 24 FEMINIST STUDIES 55, 59 (1998) ("We
should not think of welfare as a subsidy for dependence but as insurance for the
rights that comprise independence.").
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reform attempted to reverse the incentive structure to make
it more economically feasible for poor mothers to go to work.
As Sarah Ramsey points out, "the PRWORA did substantially
reduce work disincentives that were present in AFDC, includ-
ing providing more generous access to Medicaid and childcare
subsidies."' States have implemented programs that allow
families to keep varying amounts of their earned income
without reducing their TANF grant, making their wages more
valuable.65 The PRWORA also provides for training pro-
grams, job counseling, and other services to improve welfare
recipients' employment skills. "Overall," Professor Ramsey
concludes, "TANF recipients benefit more from employment
than did AFDC recipients."66
Moreover, many welfare-recipient mothers have re-
sponded enthusiastically to new programs that facilitate their
entry into the paid workforce.67 Every respondent in my own
qualitative study of Illinois parents receiving TANF ex-
pressed a preference for earning an income.' The mothers
who were not employed at the time of the interview wanted
education and training to get a job.69 Those who were already
working wanted a better job with higher pay." The inter-
64. Sarah H. Ramsey, Children in Poverty: Reconciling Children's Interests
with Child Protective and Welfare Policies: A Response to Ward Doran and Rob-
erts, 61 MD. L. REV. 437, 447 (2002).
65. See NORMA B. COE ET AL., THE URBAN INSTITUTE, DOES WORK PAY? A
SUMMARY OF THE WORK INCENTIVES UNDER TANF 3 (1998).
66. Ramsey, supra note 64, at 448.
67. Czapanskiy, supra note 10, at 332.
68. See Morgan B. Ward Doran & Dorothy E. Roberts, Welfare Reform and
Families in the Child Welfare System, 61 MD. L. REV. 386, 426 (2002). This ar-
ticle discusses findings from Doran's & Roberts' 2001 study entitled, "The Im-
pact of Welfare Reform on Families Involved in Child Protective Services: Par-
ents' Perceptions and Experiences." The purpose of this study, conducted with
Northwestern University law student Morgan Ward Doran, was to investigate
the experiences of families who both received welfare and experienced involve-
ment with the child welfare system-so-called "dual system families."
We conducted in-depth, face-to-face interviews with a subset of sixteen
dual-system parents drawn from the larger pool of families participat-
ing in the Illinois Families Study (IFS) [a longitudinal panel study
that] tracks a random sample of 1400 Illinois families who received
welfare benefits in 1998 for a six-year period. Our goal was to examine
the impact of welfare reform on the experiences of families in the IFS
who are also involved with the Illinois Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS).
Id. at 390.
69. Id. at 426-27.
70. Id. at 426.
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viewed parents preferred paid employment not only for its fi-
nancial benefits but also as a means to transition into the "le-
gitimate" world.7' Respondents equated paid work with nor-
malcy. "And then I would see other people working and, you
know, doing stuff like normal people do," Angela, a thirty-
four-year-old African American single mother explained.
"And I wanted to be a normal, productive member of society
just like them., 72
The reduction in work disincentives, however, should not
be interpreted as an increase in mothers' freedom to transi-
tion between home and the market. Indeed, the philosophy
underlying welfare reform and the key features of welfare-to-
work programs create tensions between caregiving and paid
employment. Welfare reform does not create the conditions
necessary to enable poor single mothers to transition success-
fully from full-time caregiving at home to paid work. There is
a difference between removing disincentives to paid employ-
ment and making paid employment a viable means of sup-
porting a family. Welfare reform fails to offer a realistic op-
portunity to earn a livable income both because it does too
little to improve single mothers' earning capacity and, more
fundamentally, because its goal is not single mothers' eco-
nomic security. In addition, welfare reform denies poor
mothers' economic freedom because it devalues and penalizes
their care work.
A. Increasing the Tension Between Caregiving and Low-
Wage Work
1. Earning a Liveable Wage
Sociologists Kathryn Edin and Laura Lein demonstrated
in their 1997 book Making Ends Meet: How Single Mothers
Survive on Welfare and Low- Wage Work that even before the
passage of the 1996 law, it was impossible for mothers to pro-
vide adequately for their children on a welfare check.73 They
reported that poor mothers use welfare benefits to supple-
ment low wages and other sources of income and to tide them
71. Id.at 427.
72. Id.
73. KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET: How SINGLE
MOTHERS SURVIVE ON WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE WORK 20-59 (1997).
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over during bouts of unemployment. "[N]either welfare nor
work provided enough income for families to live on," Edin
and Lein concluded."4 Research conducted after welfare re-
form shows that the type of work attainable -by many welfare
recipients cannot raise their families above the poverty line.75
Although eighty percent of the women who voluntarily leave
welfare find employment," these jobs tend to be in the same
types of industries, and with the same level of pay, as other
poor and low-income mothers." Involuntary welfare "leav-
ers"-those who reach time-limits or are sanctioned-are
even more likely to face financial disaster. Only about fifty
percent of the women forced to exit welfare find a job.7
Moreover, low-income families lose eligibility for key pub-
lic benefits as their incomes grow. 9 Families often lose eligi-
bility for child care subsidies and Medicaid before they earn
enough to pay for these services. The denial of benefits de-
pletes the family's income that must now stretch to cover the
lost services and makes it more difficult for mothers to care
for their children while keeping a job. Thus, although the
parents in my study viewed paid employment as desirable,
they also worried that earning income would affect their cash
benefits, Food Stamps, and medical coverage." Despite its
benefits, joining the labor force had serious costs that made it
74. Id. at 6.
75. See Randy Albelda, Fallacies of Welfare-to-Work Policies, in LOST
GROUND: WELFARE REFORM, POVERTY, AND BEYOND 79 (Randy Albelda & Ann
Withorn eds., 2002); Mary Corcoran et al., How Welfare Reform Is Affecting
Women's Work, ANNUAL REV. OF SOCIOLOGY 241 (2000) ("Average income levels
of the families leaving welfare are still at or near poverty levels."); Sandra Dan-
ziger et al., Work, Income, and Material Hardship After Welfare Reform, 34 J.
CONSUMER AFF. 6, 7 (2000); Nancy K. Cauthen & Hsien-Hen Lu, Employment
Alone Is Not Enough for America's Low-Income Children and Families (Na-
tional Center for Children in Poverty) Aug. 2003, at 2, at
http://www.nccp.org/publat03a.html ("[L]ow-wage employment, . . . by itself is
insufficient to move families from poverty to economic self-sufficiency.").
76. See SARAH BRAUNER & PAMELA LOPREST, URB. INST., WHERE ARE THEY
Now? WHAT STATES' STUDIES OF PEOPLE WHO LEFT WELFARE TELL US (1999),
at http://urban.org/UploadedPDF/anf32.pdf.
77. See PAMELA LOPREST, URB. INST., FAMILIES WHO LEFT WELFARE: WHO
ARE THEY AND How ARE THEY DOING (1999), at
www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=310290.
78. BRAUNER & LOPREST, supra note 76, at tbl.5 (showing employment rates
for people who were forced off welfare in Iowa, Tennessee, and Michigan); see
also id. at 8.
79. Cauthen & Lu, supra note 75, at 7.
80. Ward Doran & Roberts, supra note 68, at 427.
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difficult to provide food and medical care to their children.
In addition, the benefits that accrue to employment, such
as Social Security, unemployment insurance, and workers
compensation, are best for workers at the opposite end of the
labor market.8' As Mary O'Connell notes, "[t]he greatest se-
curity belongs to those whose attachment to paid work is
lengthy, uninterrupted, and highly remunerative."82 Most
mothers, especially those transitioning from welfare to low-
wage jobs, cannot meet the work pattern requirements for the
most generous social entitlements. Most states, for example,
have limited or no protections for workers who leave their
jobs for compelling family reasons or because of employers'
family-hostile policies.83
The work-family conflict that low-wage workers experi-
ence is more acute than the commonly reported trade-offs
that professional women make in juggling the demands of
their busy careers with raising children. The jobs available to
low-skilled women, with few benefits, irregular hours, and lit-
tle time off, are the least compatible with caregiving.8 4 Low-
skilled jobs at the bottom end of the labor market offer little
flexibility in scheduling work hours and often require non-
standard or irregular hours. They give workers no power to
negotiate time away from the workplace to attend important
family events or take care of family emergencies. "As cur-
rently implemented, the welfare-to-work solution is a match
made in hell," economist Randy Albelda observes.8
81. See Mary E. O'Connell, On the Fringe: Rethinking the Link Between
Wages and Benefits, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1421, 1423 (1993); Lucy A. Williams, Un-
employment Insurance and Low Wage Work, in HARD LABOR 158 (Joel F. Han-
dler & Lucie White eds., 1999); see also Gillian Lester, Unemployment Insur-
ance and Wealth Distribution, 49 UCLA L. REV. 335 (2001) (providing a
historical and economic analysis of unemployment insurance, as well as critique
of proposals to liberalize eligibility as a means for progressive wealth distribu-
tion).
82. O'Connell, supra note 81, at 1423.
83. See Karen Syma Czapanskiy, Unemployment Insurance Reform for
Moms, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1093, 1094 (2004).
84. EDIN & LEIN, supra note 73, at 8.
85. Albelda, supra note 75, at 80. The proposed TANF reauthorization bill,
moreover, increases the number of hours recipients are required to work outside
the home. Parents of school-aged children are currently required to work out-
side the home thirty hours per week and those with children under the age of
six for twenty hours per week. The bill passed by the House of Representatives
in February 2003 increases the work requirement for all recipients to forty
hours. The Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2003,
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It joins together poor mothers with few resources whose
family responsibilities require employment flexibility with
jobs in the low-wage labor market that often are the most
inflexible, have the least family-necessary benefits (vaca-
tion time, health care, sick days) and provide levels of pay
that often are insufficient to support a single person, let
alone a family. 6
Meanwhile most of the progress in workplace accommo-
dations for caregiving has occurred in professional, white col-
lar offices for the benefit of middle-class and affluent women
who have vastly greater child care resources than do welfare
recipients.87
These rigid working conditions are especially onerous for
welfare recipients because they are much more likely than
others to have children with chronic health problems.88 Work-
ing, moreover, can interfere with "keeping their children out
of danger-off the streets, off drugs, out of gangs, not preg-
nant, and in school." 9 "Because virtually all the women we
interviewed were at least as concerned with parenting as
with providing," Kathryn Edin and Laura Lein explain,
"many chose not to work for a time."9" Thus, while favoring
paid employment, poor and low-income mothers may make
the well-considered decision to stay home for the benefit of
their children.
2. Subsidized Child Care
Lack of access to high-quality, affordable child care is one
of the chief barriers to transitioning from welfare to work.91
Numerous studies have documented the association between
the availability of child care and single mothers' employ-
ment.92 Although mothers with low child care costs are more
H.R. 4, 108th Cong. (2003).
86. Albelda, supra note 75, at 80.
87. See Czapanskiy, supra note 10, at 316 n.30 (noting that "most of the
movement toward reducing work-family conflict has focused on relatively
higher-income parents").
88. S. Jody Heymann & Alison Earle, The Impact of Welfare Reform on
Parents' Ability to Care for Their Children's Health, 89 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
502, 503 (1999).
89. EDIN & LEIN, supra note 73, at 7.
90. Id. at 8.
91. See Barbara Gault et al., Prospects for Low-Income Mothers' Economic
Survival Under Welfare Reform, in PUBLIUS, Summer 1998, 175, 187-90.
92. See Sandra K. Danziger, Elizabeth Oltmans Anant, & Kimberly G.
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likely to be employed, unreliable child care interferes with
steady employment.93
In implementing welfare reform, Congress recognized the
necessity of providing subsidized child care to enable mothers
to leave welfare for low-wage jobs and to help low-income
families stay off welfare.94 The Child Care and Development
Fund (CCDF) provides states with federal funds to increase
the "availability, affordability, and quality of child care ser-
vices" to TANF recipients participating in work-related activi-
ties, families transitioning off TANF, and other low-income
working families.95 Congress gives states discretion to set
child care policies and to allocate federal funds among these
groups of families. The block grant for child care allocated
$20 billion for the period 1997 to 2002, a $4 billion increase
over prior allocations.96 States may supplement the federal
child care grant by shifting federal funds from their TANF
block grants. In addition, the Child and Dependent Care Tax
Credit gives working parents tax reductions for child care ex-
penses.97 As a result of increased federal and state spending
on child care, the number of children served more than dou-
bled between 1996 and 2001. 98
Despite these programs, welfare reform contributed to a
shortfall in child care funds by requiring thousands of single
mothers who used to care for their children at home to enter
the workforce. The number of families in need of subsidized
care far exceeds the supply provided by federal reimburse-
ment programs.99 A recent federal examination of state child
Browning, Chiidcare Subsidies and the Transition from Welfare to Work, Na-
tional Poverty Center Working Paper #03-11 (Nov. 2003), at
http://www.npc.umich.edu/publications/working-papers/paperli/03-11.pdf.
93. Id. (noting that "problems with child care can lead single mothers to
leave jobs and also can adversely affect attendance, work hours, and career ad-
vancement").
94. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHILD CARE: RECENT STATE
POLICY CHANGES AFFECTING THE AVAILABILITY OF ASSISTANCE FOR Low-
INCOME FAMILIES 1 (2003), at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03588.pdf [here-
inafter GAO CHILD CARE REPORT].
95. Child Care and Development Fund, 45 C.F.R. § 98.1(6) (2000).
96. GAO CHILD CARE REPORT, supra note 94, at 15.
97. I.R.C. § 21 (a)(1) (1994).
98. Jennifer Mezey, Threatened Progress. US. in Danger of Losing Ground
on Child Care for Low-Income Working Families, CENTER FOR L. & SOC. POLY,
JUNE 2003, at 1, at
http://www.clasp.org/DMS/Documents/1054310396.55/CCbrief2.pdf.
99. Gault et al., supra note 91, at 187; Jennifer Mezey et al., Unfinished
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care policy discovered that "half of the states do not provide
child care assistance to all the families who apply and are eli-
gible for such assistance under the states' eligibility poli-
cies." ' °° In 1999, sixty-one percent of low-income families re-
ceived no state assistance with child care,'0 ' and in 2000, only
one in seven eligible children received child care aid. 1 2 In Oc-
tober 2003, almost 50,000 children from working poor fami-
lies in New York City were on a waiting list for spots in city-
subsidized day care and after-school programs. 3 The inade-
quacy of funding for child care means that many welfare re-
cipients have difficulty transitioning to the market, either
forgoing job opportunities or finding it infeasible to keep a job
for extended periods."
Indeed, for many low-income single mothers, "child care
is a perpetual emergency."' ° The constant struggle to deal
with child care makes it extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to meet the demands of a full-time job, especially one with
non-standard or inflexible hours. When mothers cannot af-
ford reliable child care, they must often decide between the
two evils of leaving children unsupervised or in hazardous
care and losing their jobs.' 6 A spate of tragic cases in New
York City revealed the "desperate measures" some parents
feel forced to take while "juggling keeping their children safe
with keeping their bosses happy."' 7 Two Brooklyn children
perished in an arson fire when their mother left them home
alone to work a late shift at McDonald's after their baby-
Agenda: Child Care for Low-Income Families Since 1996, Implications for Fed-
eral and State Policy (2002), at
http://www.clasp.org/DMS/Documents/1023976012.01/unfinished-agenda full r
eport.pdf (reporting that 1.8 million children receiving child care subsidies rep-
resent only twelve to eighteen percent of income-eligible children).
100. GAO CHILD CARE REPORT, supra note 94, at 2.
101. Linda Giannarelli et al., Getting Help with Child Care Expenses, URB.
INST., Feb. 2003, at 62, at
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310615_0P62.pdf.
102. Mezey, supra note 98, at 3.
103. Joanne Wasserman, A Crisis of KIds LeAt All Alone, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
Oct. 27, 2003, § 1 (News), at 6.
104. Gault et al., supra note 91, at 187.
105. Linda C. McClain, Care as a Public Value: Linking Responsibility, Re-
sources, and Republicanism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1673, 1693 (2001).
106. Nina Bernstein, Daily Choice Turned Deadly: Children Left on Their
Own, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2003, at Al.
107. Wasserman, supra note 103.
1048 Vol: 44
LO WINCOME MOTHERS
sitter and father failed to arrive in time. °8 Earlier that
month, another low-income mother was arrested after she left
her twenty-three-month-old son in the care of a teenager she
did not know well who absconded with the child for a day.'°9
Parents who cannot find affordable child care often rely
on older siblings to care for young children or send children
away to live with relatives, sometimes located overseas."'
Older children increasingly go to public libraries and shop-
ping malls in the afternoons when there is no subsidized af-
ter-school program."'
The study I conducted with Morgan Ward Doran con-
firmed that TANF's expectation that parents find and keep
jobs without adequate child care made it difficult for parents
to care for their children."' As we reported,
[Parents] must secure satisfactory child care or risk sanc-
tions for missing work and possible involvement with the
child welfare system. Indeed, the parents we interviewed
indicated that a lack of child care was the main reason
why they were unable to exit the welfare rolls.1
3
The parents we interviewed discussed an assortment of
problems with their access to child care services. An initial
obstacle was locating a trustworthy, competent provider."'
Many parents rejected the child care workers provided by the
public aid office and insisted on finding someone they trusted
to care for their children. "I'm really not trusting in the De-
partment of Public Aid's babysitters so I have to find one,"
Angela, a thirty-four-year-old African American single mother
explained, "I just don't trust the people that they pick. They
have a list of people that they, like, want [you] to pick from,
but I want to find my own sitter.""5 Angela stated that she
planned to wait until her oldest daughter was able to care for
108. Id.; Bernstein, supra note 106.
109. Wasserman, supra note 103.
110. See id.; Rob Green et al., Welfare Reform's Effect on Child Welfare
Caseloads, URB. INST., (2001), at
http://www.urban.org/Template.cfm?Section=ByTopic&NavMenuID=62&templa
te=/TaggedContent/ViewPublication.cfm&PublicationID=7039; McClain, supra
note 105, at 1712.
111. Wasserman, supra note 103.
112. See Ward Doran & Roberts, supra note 68, at 422-24.
113. Id. at 422.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 423.
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the younger children before she transitioned to full-time em-
ployment.
116
Parents we interviewed also reported that problems with
housing and transportation interfered with their ability to ar-
range adequate child care, and therefore, to stay employed. 1 7
Families that must relocate on a daily basis because they lack
adequate housing cannot secure a regular child care ar-
rangement. Similarly, parents observed that lacking a means
to transport caregivers to their home, or their children to the
caregiver, resulted in erratic child care, causing them to miss
work."
Finally, the welfare bureaucracy's inefficient provision of
subsidies posed barriers to accessing child care services. Sev-
eral parents we interviewed complained that the state's delay
in paying child care providers made it difficult to keep good
care providers. According to Kelly, a twenty-nine-year-old Af-
rican American mother who is separated from her husband,
the public assistance child care program "takes so long to get
[the babysitters] their money-like 2 or 3 months. They want
their money right then and there.""9  Mothers sometimes
have to pay caregivers out of their own pockets until the pub-
lic assistance program kicks in. The extensive application
process and other bureaucratic requirements discourage
many providers from signing up with the public assistance
program.' The fact that child care subsidies are typically set
below market rates for care also deters potential providers.
Our finding of problems with child care despite assis-
tance programs is supported by a recent Michigan study com-
paring poor families who received child care subsidies and
those without subsidies. 2' The study confirmed prior findings
that receipt of a child care subsidy predicts increased work
participation and earnings. 2 The researchers also found,
however, that respondents who received subsidies experi-
enced equal levels of work disruptions, work-related child
care problems, and parental stress as those without subsidies.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 423-24.
118. Ward Doran & Roberts, supra note 68, at 424.
119. Id. at 423.
120. Id. at 423-24.
121. See Danziger, Oltmans Ananat & Browning, supra note 92, at 3.
122. Id. at 21-24.
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"IT]he lack of difference on these measures," they observed,
"suggests that care-related problems persisted regardless of
subsidy receipt."123 The researchers could not determine,
however, "whether the subsidy was insufficient to secure
more stable care, or whether, when child care was disrupted,
it was difficult to maintain the subsidy."
124
Recent debates over TANF re-authorization and state
budget shortfalls indicate that child care funding is likely to
remain stagnant or even be cut.125 At the federal level, the
Bush Administration proposed flat funding for the TANF and
child care block grants in its FY 2004 budget, which would
result in a tremendous loss of subsidies owing to inflation
alone.' Moreover, proposed increases in the number of hours
recipients are required to work will escalate child care costs
by an estimated $6.1 billion. 
27
At the state level, TANF reserves previously used for
child care subsidies are dwindling while states are experienc-
ing TANF caseload increases and unprecedented fiscal cri-
ses.' The General Accounting Office discovered that since
January 2001, two-thirds of states made key policy changes
that affect the availability of government aid for child care.'2 9
Of these states, twenty-three made changes tending to de-
crease access to child care assistance, while only nine made
changes tending to increase access.' According to Jennifer
Mezey, Senior Staff Attorney at the Center for Law and So-
cial Policy, "[t]he period of growth essentially stopped by
2001."' ' Policies employed by states to reduce child care
spending include changing income eligibility thresholds,
123. Id. at 17.
124. Id at 17-18.
125. See GAO CHILD CARE REPORT, supra note 94 (reporting changes in state
child care policies since January 2001 in response to budget problems and com-
peting demands for TANF and state funds); Sharon Parrott & Jennifer Mezey,
New Child Care Resources Are Needed to Prevent the Loss of Child Care Assis-
tance for Hundreds of Thousands of Children, CENTER FOR L. & Soc. POLY,
July 15, 2003, at http://www.clasp.org/DMS/Documents/1058295869.52/7-15-
03tanf.pdf.
126. Mezey, supra note 98, at 5.
127. Id. at 5-6.
128. Id. at 1, 4.
129. GAO CHILD CARE REPORT, supra note 94, at 2.
130. Id. (noting three additional states made a combination of changes in-
creasing and decreasing availability of child care assistance).
131. Mezey, supra note 98, at 1.
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starting waiting lists, freezing enrollment of new families,
and increasing the amount of copayments parents must
make.'32 Some states have also cut spending for initiatives to
improve the quality of child care services. "' Improving the
quality of child care for poor children is essential because
most subsidized child care centers at the time welfare reform
was enacted "provide[d] care that could compromise a child's
future learning abilities" and many were dangerous.'
B. State Opposition to Single Mothers'Economic Security
More fundamentally, the PRWORA and the Bush Ad-
ministration do not support single mothers' economic secu-
rity. Although a primary goal of welfare reform is to push
poor single mothers into the wage workforce, it is not to make
single mothers economically independent. As noted above, a
twin goal of the PRWORA is the promotion of marriage.
While eschewing the early welfare system's support of single
mothers' domestic service, contemporary welfare policy resur-
rects the norm of mothers' dependence on a husband's earn-
ings. Welfare reform's support for marriage, moreover, goes
beyond giving single mothers' inadequate aid to provide for
their children to setting goals for states to increase the num-
ber of two-parent families and reduce out-of-wedlock births.
Some states have pursued this goal by penalizing unmarried
recipients and rewarding recipients who marry."'
Debates surrounding the reauthorization of TANF have
directed even more attention to the state's role in encouraging
132. GAO CHILD CARE REPORT, supra note 94, at 26.
133. Danielle Ewen & Katherine Hart, State Budget Cuts Create a Growing
Child Care Crisis for Low-Income Working Families, Child. Def. Fund, (2003),
at
http://www.childrensdefense.org/childcre/childcare/statebudgetLcuts-2003.pdf.
134. Clare Huntington, Welfare Reform and Child Care: A Proposal for State
Legislation, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 95, 102 n.25 (1996).
135. LEGAL MOMENTUM, WELFARE AND POVERTY: STATE MARRIAGE
INITIATIVES, at http://www.legalmomentum.org/issues/wel/statemarriage.shtml;
see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 44: 10-3.4-3.7 (repealed 1997). But see ROBERT E.
RECTOR, MELISSA G. PARDUE & LAUREN R. NOYES, "Martiage Plus" Sabotaging
the President's Efforts to Promote Healthy Marriage, BACKGROUNDER No. 1677,
Aug. 22, 2003, at 3-4, at
http://www.heritage.org/Researchlwelfare/loader.cfm?url+/commonspot/security/
getfile.cfm&PageID=47884 (arguing that all means-tested programs, such as
TANF, food stamps, and Medicaid, reward single motherhood and discourage
marriage among low-income couples).
1052 Vol: 44
LO WINCOME MOTHERS
marriage among welfare recipients and low-income parents.3 '
The TANF reauthorization bill passed by the House of Repre-
sentatives in February 2003, the Personal Responsibility,
Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2003, includes three pro-
grams to promote marriage-Healthy Marriage Promotion
Grants for a specified list of marriage-related activities, in-
cluding public advertising campaigns, education in high
schools, and marriage skills training; Research, Demonstra-
tion, and Technical Assistance Projects; and a fatherhood
program. ' In January 2004, President George W. Bush an-
nounced an initiative to reinforce welfare reform's marriage
goals by spending $1.5 billion on training programs to
strengthen marriages among low-income parents.'
3
Wade Horn, Assistant Secretary for the Administration
of Children and Families, has focused federal welfare policy
on marriage promotion. In a 2003 report published by the Ac-
ton Institute, Dr. Horn advocated "preferences for marriage
in every aspect of public policy," including "requir[ing] that
participants be married, not just cohabitating, in order to
qualify for two-parent family [welfare] benefits."'39 But Dr.
Horn's pro-marriage philosophy goes beyond supporting mar-
riage to preferring mothers' economic reliance on husbands
over mothers' own economic self-sufficiency. Dr. Horn ex-
pressed concern that "help[ing] single mothers achieve self-
sufficiency through work" is "to some extent in conflict" with
the Bush Administration's "strategies for promoting father-
hood and marriage" because economic independence may "en-
able unmarried women to rear children without the presence
of the father."'4 ° "An increase in the earnings of single moth-
ers," Horn worried, ma.r "decrease the probability that they
136. See Mary Parke, Marriage-Related Provisions in Recent Welfare Reau-
thorization Proposals: A Summary, CENTER FOR L. & SOC. POL'y (2003), at
http://www.clasp.org/DMS/Documents/1056725608.93/marr prov upd.pdf.
137. See id.
138. See Robert Pear & David D. Kirkpatrick, Bush Plans $1.5 Billion Drive
for Promotion of Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 2004, at Al (noting that the
President's marriage initiative was included in the House of Representatives'
TANF reauthorization bill).
139. Wade Horn & Andrew Bush, Fathers, Marriage, and the Next Phase of
Welfare Reform, ACTON INST. POLY F., Spring 2003, at
http://www.acton.org/ppolicy/forum/ActonPolicy-Forum No 3.pdf; see also
Gwendolyn Mink, Violating Women: Rights Abuses in the Welfare Policy State,
577 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI 79, 88-89 (2001).
140. Horn & Bush, supra note 139.
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will marry. '
In fact, recent research shows that the Bush Administra-
tion grossly misjudges the relationship between women's eco-
nomic security and marriage. Far from decreasing the
chances of marrying, improving poor women's financial foun-
dation appears key to their decision to get married. In Prom-
ises I Can Keep: Why Poor Women Put Motherhood Before
Marriage, Kathryn Edin and Maria Kefalas explain why the
165 low-income single mothers they interviewed "have chil-
dren they can't afford, and why they don't marry."' They
found that these women were interested in marriage, but be-
lieve that marriage should be reserved for couples who are
economically stable. According to the interviewed women, the
ability to purchase the material ingredients of a respectable
lifestyle-a house, furniture, car, and a decent wedding-is a
crucial prerequisite for marriage."
A critical aspect of financial stability for these women is
securing their own income and assets to guarantee economic
independence from their husbands. They see economic inde-
pendence before marriage as necessary to provide insurance
against marital failure and loss of power in the relationship.'"
The women want to ensure that they will retain assets in the
event of a divorce. They also fear that marriage will give
their partners license to enforce traditional gender roles in
the household.' Financial independence affords women
some leverage to counter their husbands' controlling behav-
ior. As a Puerto Rican mother explained, "I think you should
get married after you finish school and you have a good de-
gree, making good money where you have your own place,
and you don't have to have a man that's always behind you
telling you what to do and how to do it. " "' Thus, many poor
single mothers have rejected the male breadwinner ideal and
141. Id.
142. KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR
WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 11 (forthcoming 2004) (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with the Santa Clara Law Review).
143. Id. at 136-46.
144. Id. at 137-38.
145. Id. at 143-46.
146. Id. at 138; see Shelby A.D. Moore, Understanding the Connection Be-
tween Domestic Violence, Crime, and Poverty., How Welfare Reform May Keep
Battered Women from Lea ting Abusive Relationships, 12 TExAS J. WOMEN & L.
451 (2003) (discussing the relationship between welfare reform and women's
freedom to leave abusive relationships).
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hinge their decisions to marry on their own economic security.
C. Devaluing Caregiiqng
Finally, welfare reform denies poor mothers' economic
freedom because its economic incentives are lopsided. While
facilitating work in the low-wage market, the PRWORA pe-
nalizes care work at home.'47
Underlying TANF's work requirements and time limits is
the assumption that paid work, as opposed to welfare receipt,
provides financial and cognitive benefits to poor mothers and
their children. This position considers welfare receipt in and
of itself-independent of economic and sociodemographic fac-
tors-as a harmful force on family functioning and child de-
velopment.' According to this theory, welfare undermines
recipients' motivation and self-esteem by discouraging work
and deprives children of a positive role model.'49 Welfare re-
form advocates claim that by encouraging mothers to work,
TANF improves recipients' self-perception, conferring cogni-
tive and social benefits to their children.5 '
. Forcing low-skilled mothers into the workforce regardless
of the type or conditions of employment available to them as-
sumes that any job is more beneficial to their families than
the care they provide at home."' "The Personal Responsibil-
ity Act does not make work pay, or even make work avail-
able," observes welfare historian Gwendolyn Mink. "Yet it in-
sists that single mothers are worth more outside their homes
than in them."15 2 This work ethic is reinforced by setting wel-
fare benefits below the amount earned at a minimum wage
job, both to avoid disturbing low-wage markets and to give re-
147. My criticism of welfare reform is the opposite of some scholars' criticism
of the caregiving approach. See, e.g., Selmi & Cahn, supra note 52, at 306 (ar-
guing that proposals to recognize caregiving "reveal a preference for care work,
all of which are designed to facilitate, or accommodate, care work outside of the
labor market rather than to lighten the burden of care work so as to enable
women to devote more time to paid wage work").
148. See Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U. KAN. L.
REV. 229, 247 (2000).
149. See CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND 147-66 (1984).
150. See generally id.
151. See Czapanskiy, supra note 10, at 372 (noting that under work-first wel-
fare reform programs "turning down a job is usually cause for termination of
welfare benefits" and that "[r]ecipients are expected to take any job that is of-
fered, regardless of whether the work conditions are family-friendly").
152. GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE'S END 113 (1998).
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cipients a financial incentive to leave the welfare rolls for
paid employment.153
TANF's emphasis on paid employment often conflicts
with recipients' own sense of being a mother. Stephanie Li-
moncelli, a sociology graduate student at UCLA, discovered
this competing conception of good parenting when she ob-
served a Southern California welfare-to-work program.TM Li-
moncelli noted the tension between the importance the pro-
gram's staff placed on work outside the home and the
importance participants placed on caring for their children.155
The trainers stressed that maternal responsibilities were
secondary to paid work and that the mothers should not let
their children interfere with their efforts to find and keep a
job."'56 For example, they instructed participants never to
admit to leaving a job as a result of pregnancy and not to
interrupt their job search to care for sick children." 7 One
trainer suggested that participants impress potential
employers by boasting, "I'm a workaholic. I often stay so late
that I neglect my family!"
158
The staff also tried to persuade the mothers that taking
care of children meant providing financial support rather
than spending time with them.'59 Participants "countered the
program's 'workfirst' focus by articulating a 'childfirst' phi-
losophy," writes Limoncelli. 60 Whereas the program materi-
als assumed that employment was the only source of mater-
nal self-esteem and worth, the participants insisted that
motherhood was the most positive and fulfilling part of their
lives.
Welfare reform's very philosophy-that paid employment
is the test for good parenting and should take precedence over
nurturing children-denies any value in recipients' caregiving
153. ROSE, supra note 27, at 10; ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 15, at 201;
FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR 371 (2d
ed. 1993).
154. See Stephanie Limoncelli, "Some of Us Are Excellent at Babies:" Paid
Work, Mothering, and Construction of Need in a Welfare-to- Work Program, in
WORK, WELFARE, AND POLITICS: CONFRONTING POVERTY IN THE WAKE OF
REFORM (Frances Fox Piven et al. eds., 2002).
155. Id. at 83.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 90.
158. Id. at 91.
159. Id.
160. See Limoncelli, supra note 154, at 93.
Vol: 441056
LO WINCOME MOTHERS
and supports efforts to foreclose recipients' decision to care for
their children at home. Thus, the PRWORA denies poor sin-
gle mothers the financial support they need either to raise
their children as full-time caregivers or as wage laborers.
IV. PROMOTING ECONOMIC FREEDOM
Many of the mothers Lisa Belkin interviewed for her New
York Times Magazine article had not opted out of the market
forever. Rather, they made the decision to stay at home to
care for children temporarily, with the hope of returning to
their careers after several years. After describing several
women's movements in and out of the workforce, Belkin
writes:
All that coming and going, they say, is the entire point.
"This is not permanent," Kresse says. "It's not black and
white; it's gray. You're working. Then you're not working.
Then maybe you're working part time or consulting. Then
you go back. This is a chapter, not the whole book."
161
The mothers' decision to temporarily put their careers on
hold in exchange for full-time caregiving reflects a typical
pattern for working women. Most mothers adjust the amount
of time they spend at home and in the workforce to accommo-
date various changes in their family life, such as the birth of a
child, illness of a family member, and competing demands or
benefits of employment.'6 2
To be sure, even these privileged women encounter ob-
stacles to resuming their careers and pay a steep cost for rais-
ing children that their husbands do not incur. 63 Some ob-
servers might question whether they freely chose to leave
their jobs or were forced out by their careers' hostility to chil-
dren and their husbands' superior economic prospects.
Moreover, their privileged status affords them the ability
to leave work without challenging the race, class, and gender
structures that limit welfare recipients' options. They have
the freedom to move because they can rely on their husbands'
161. Belkin, supra note 1, at 58.
162. See Czapanskiy, supra note 10, at 315-16, 370-72 (describing children's
need for time and flexibility); STEWART D. FRIEDMAN & JEFFREY H.
GREENHAUS, WORK AND FAMILY - ALLIES OF ENEMIES? 19-40 (2000) (describing
how professional women balance work and family responsibilities).
163. See CRITTENDEN, supra note 2, at 100-09; HEWLETT, supra note 2, at 86-
91.
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income to support the family and can afford supports for their
caregiving, such as child care and the option of part-time em-
ployment, when they return to the job. By putting their ca-
reers on hold to care for their children, these well-educated,
affluent women have done nothing to revolutionize the gen-
dered division of labor, abolish the male worker ideal, or in-
crease state and private support for working parents. In-
stead, they have become dependent on a bread-winning
husband. "Not only must they worry about re-entering the
job market," Barbara Stark wrote in a letter to the editor,
"they should be worrying about keeping their present jobs-
as wives.'
'16
Yet the celebration in some quarters of these mothers'
decision to "opt out" highlights a fundamental unfairness in
welfare reform. What would it take to give low-income moth-
ers more freedom to move between caregiving and paid work?
What resources are needed to compensate their care work in
the home and help them to support their families by earning
an income? It is important to recognize that increasing
mothers' economic freedom generally would require trans-
forming the workplace to abolish the male worker ideal and
other sex inequities in the labor market, as well as transform-
ing the gendered division of caregiving either by allocating
the responsibility more equally between mothers and fathers
or by compensating women adequately.'65 It would require
eliminating discrimination against women in the job market
on the basis of sex and race and creating jobs that pay a live-
able wage."
My focus in this article, however, is on welfare reform
and its implications for the economic freedom of poor and low-
income mothers. These women are the most disadvantaged
by unjust social policies and structures and have the least re-
sources to care for their children. Moreover, although welfare
directly affects women's relationship to only "a small fraction
164. Barbara Stark, Letters, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2003, § 6 (Magazine), at 14.
165. See generally WILLIAMS, supra note 2; Eileen Appelbaum, et al., Shared
Work- Valued Care: New Norms for Organizing Market Work and Unpaid Care
Work, 23 ECON. & INDUS. DEMOCRACY 125 (2002) (examining practices in Ja-
pan, Australia, Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy to propose ways
in which work and care responsibilities might be reorganized, including enact-
ing hours-of-work legislation, protecting part-time workers, sharing the cost of
care, and updating income security protections and benefits).
166. See generally Selmi & Cahn, supra note 52, at 310-12.
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of our economy, its impact is more widespread because it
reinforces gender, race, and class norms and stratifications.
Welfare policy helps to maintain even the affluent mother's
precarious reliance on her husband's salary by stigmatizing
mothering outside of marriage along with any government aid
that supports it. We should advocate for changes in welfare
law along with changes in other economic and family policies
to promote women's economic freedom by valuing nonmarket
work and increasing women's economic security.
A. Guaranteed Income
TANF imposes a lopsided preference for paid employ-
ment and accords no economic recognition for the work of
raising children. It is part of a broader welfare system that
stigmatizes the household labor of poor, single, and minority
women in particular. Moreover, eliminating the federal enti-
tlement to welfare helps to keep wages low by compelling re-
cipients to accept low-paying jobs without benefits. Thus, the
absence of a guaranteed income restricts women's freedom in
terms of both care and market work.
Increasing economic freedom would require reinstating
the entitlement to public assistance, increasing cash and
other benefits to guarantee a family-sustaining income, and
abolishing all time limits on welfare receipt. According to
Premilla Nadasen, the welfare rights movement demanded a
guaranteed income for these multiple reasons: "It forced the
state to recognize housework and childcare as legitimate
work, freed women from dependence on men, debunked the
racial characterizations of Black women as lazy by acknowl-
edging the work they did as mothers, and gave women a vi-
167. Williams, supra note 34, at 414 (noting that public assistance programs
constitute only three to four percent of the federal budget and arguing entitle-
ment programs, such as social security, unemployment insurance, and tax and
other social expenditures, are more important to the analysis of women's rela-
tionship to the public distribution of wealth). I support Professor Williams' call
for a wider analysis of women's economic security to include a broad range of
government wealth-distribution programs as well as entitlements based on fam-
ily relationships. See id. at 414-15. I also believe it is critical to analyze the re-
lationship between welfare programs for poor single mothers, who are dispro-
portionately women of color, and the gendered allocation of public and private
entitlements. These are interlocking and mutually reinforcing subsystems that
create gendered arrangements of caregiving and labor market participation. I
am grateful to Ann Orloff for suggesting this analysis.
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able option to degrading labor market conditions."168
Of course, abolishing a guaranteed income-even one
that keeps recipients below the poverty line-was precisely
the aim of the 1996 welfare reform law. It would be conced-
edly difficult to reinstate the federal guarantee of benefits
and to increase those benefits substantially. The proposals
that follow, which could be implemented at the state and local
level, may be more realistic. Nevertheless, a guaranteed in-
come is critical to increasing low-income mothers' freedom to
decide to remain home when they determine it is in their
families' best interests and to increasing wages. A guaran-
teed income should be supplemented with other measures
that make paid labor more lucrative and flexible, such as ex-
panded eligibility for the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC),
paid family leaves, and removal of penalties for part-time
work.
B. Education
Low-income mothers' economic freedom is hindered tre-
mendously by the limited options they have for employment.
As noted above, most welfare recipients enter the bottom of
the low-wage sector because they lack the education and
skills needed for a better job. A college education increases
both women's labor force participation rate and their in-
comes.169 "Without question, education remains the strongest
vehicle for increasing women's life choices," Selmi and Cahn
observe, "as education provides the best means out of poverty
and the greatest market opportunities."'70  Welfare policy,
therefore, should facilitate women's pursuit of higher educa-
tion. Instead, the PRWORA gives states wide latitude to de-
termine how to treat participation in postsecondary pro-
grams. In most states, work mandates prevent many welfare
recipients from getting a college degree because attending col-
lege does not count or counts only partially toward meeting
TANF work requirements. 7'
168. Nadasen, supra note 60, at 279.
169. See Selmi & Cahn, supra note 52, at 307.
170. See id
171. See Andrew S. Gruber, Comment, Promoting Long-Term Self-
Sufficiency for Welfare Recipients: Post-Secondary Education and the Welfare
Work Requirement, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 247 (1998); see also Jerry Jacobs & Sara
Winslow, Community Colleges: New Environments, New Directions: Welfare
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Even programs that promote postsecondary education
are too limited. For example, Senators Olympia Snowe (R-
Maine) and Max Baucus (D-Mont.) introduced legislation in
the U.S. Senate that would increase the opportunity for some
recipients to pursue postsecondary education. 7 2 Modeled on
Maine's Parents as Scholars program, the Pathways to Self-
Sufficiency Act of 2002 permits states to use TANF funds to
give the same benefits to recipients attending vocational
school or college that they would receive if working.7 ' The
cap on caseload participation in education, however, limits
the program's reach and gives welfare agencies discretion to
discriminate among TANF recipients in determining who
may take advantage of the program.'74 Moreover, the work
requirement attached to the program hinders students'
chances of completing their course of study. 7' To increase
low-income women's economic freedom, states must detach
postsecondary education from work requirements and provide
needed tuition assistance.
C Subsidized Child Care
Subsidized child care is another critical means for en-
hancing economic freedom. The federal government must in-
crease spending on child care to make it universally available
to all parents who need it. As important as the amount that
the government allocates for child care is its purpose in pro-
viding this service. The PRWORA treats child care as a tool
for facilitating mandated maternal employment. The gov-
ernment views child care subsidies as a policy strategy to
promote work, not as a means for enhancing women's eco-
Reform and Enrollment in Post-Secondary Education, 586 ANNALS AM. ACAD.
OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 194, 195 (2003); Christopher Mazzeo et al., Community Col-
leges: New Environments, New Directions. Work-First or Work-Only: Welfare
Reform, State Policy, and Access to Postsecondary Education, 586 ANNALS AM.
AcAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 144, 145 (2003).
172. See Olympia Snowe, Education Essential to Welfare Reform that Works,
The Welfare to Work Partnership, at
http://www.welfaretowork.org/gov-affairs/viewpoints/osnowe.htm. For a de-
scription of Maine's Parents as Scholars Program, see Sandra S. Butler, et al.,
The Miseducation of Welfare Reform: Denjng the Promise of Postsecondary
Education, 55 ME. L. REV. 211, 223-32 (2003).
173. See Snowe, supra note 172.
174. See Butler, supra note 172, at 233.
175. See id.
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nomic freedom and children's well being.176
Legal scholar Karen Czapanskiy observes that "[ulnder
the parlance of welfare reform, the presence of children in
need of child care is a 'barrier' to work. Once the system
identifies a child care provider, the barrier has been removed,
and the parent can go to work.""' Rather than generously
providing child care as a resource for women to make deci-
sions about caregiving and wage work, the state attaches
minimal child care subsidies to the fulfillment of work re-
quirements. Child care problems can exempt parents from
work requirements only in limited circumstances.7 1 States
need not provide child care assistance to mothers who wish to
pursue a college education or simply need a break from their
children. 17 Welfare reform compels many low-income women
to accept poor quality childcare because it provides low subsi-
dies while penalizing women who do not work. This approach
provides little incentive for fostering high quality child care
services geared toward the needs of children and their moth-
ers.
V. CONCLUSION
Should feminists advocate policies that support mothers'
caregiving at home or policies that increase mothers' partici-
pation in the paid workforce? The experience of low-income
women, whose care work is vilified and market work is un-
derpaid, shows that feminists must take action in both are-
nas. Enhancing low-income women's ability to make deci-
sions about work at home and in the market-increasing
their economic freedom-recognizes this dual discrimination.
176. See GAO CHILD CARE REPORT, supra note 94, at 1 (stating that under
TANF, "child care assistance became a significant strategy for helping welfare
recipients move into the workforce and for helping other low-income families
stay off welfare").
177. Czapanskiy, supra note 10, at 366.
178. To claim an exemption under TANF, recipients must show "1) that there
is no 'appropriate' child care provider within a 'reasonable' distance from the
[recipient's] home or work site; 2) that there is no 'suitable' informal child care
available; or 3) that there is no 'appropriate and affordable' formal child care
available." Id. at 366-67 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 607(e)(2) (2004)).
179. State rules on providing child care subsidies to students vary. New
York, for example, gives its counties the option of making four-year college edu-
cation an activity eligible for child care assistance. See GAO CHILD CARE
REPORT, supra note 94, at 33. Some states do not count participation in post-
secondary programs as work activity. See Mazzeo et al., supra note 171, at 146.
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Although welfare reform facilitates recipients' entry into the
paid workforce, it denies recipients' economic freedom in the
way it treats recipients' domestic and market labor. The
PRWORA pushes most recipients into low-wage jobs without
the resources they need to care for their children, while de-
valuing and penalizing their work in the home. Welfare pol-
icy that promotes women's economic freedom should include a
guaranteed income, support for postsecondary education, and
expanded subsidized child care.

